CNS generals have stopped their dithering and leapt into decisive action. It now seems they will never return to the barracks voluntarily. After months of dithering, the generals under the Council for National Security (CNS) have become decisive, even methodical.

The CNS has seen to it that the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was dissolved, its senior executives banned from political office for five years, and deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his immediate relatives indicted under a growing pile of corruption indictments and graft allegations.

Ostensibly stemming from the post-coup justice system without interference from the CNS, these moves have reset Thai politics and rearranged Thailand's political party landscape, putting the TRT factions and key bosses in disarray and searching for new party banners under which they can contest the general election.

Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the CNS chairman, recently suggested that the timetables for the draft constitution, its plebiscite and consequent general election could now be accelerated. He even went on to project that the post-election government will be a coalition of two to three parties.

The government of Surayud Chulanont has duly obliged by trying to move up the election date from December to Nov 25. Thailand's democratic rule is clearly half-way home. The political scene is the clearest it has been since the February 2005 election, which was soon followed by the tumultuous months of a Bangkok-based crusade against Mr Thaksin that culminated with the coup in September 2006. But not all of the clouds on Thailand's political horizon have dissipated. The three potential flashpoints in the near term will be the makeup and acceptability of the new constitution, the political realignments and the general election, and the role of the re-politicised military.

In view of the decimation of Mr Thaksin's regime, the new constitution has been amended expeditiously for a quick return to democratic rule. It has just sailed through the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). While a public referendum is now workable for sometime late next month, a host of provisions in the draft charter are problematic and contentious.

The CDA's wide-ranging amendments are no guarantee for referendum passage. Anti-coup groups from civil society along with the pro-Thaksin/pro-TRT forces have lined up against the draft charter.

A failure in the referendum would lead to more political turmoil, as the CNS in conjunction with the government of Gen Surayud would then be mandated by the interim constitution to pick any past constitution to revise for promulgation. This scenario is the next flashpoint that could galvanise street protests and rock the CNS.

Cognisant of the growing anti-charter columns, the CNS and the Surayud government will certainly do everything in their power to ram through the referendum. Their manoeuvrings will include the mobilisation of upcountry bureaucrats to lobby rural folks to approve the referendum.

Concurrently, the CNS is poised to marshal its foot soldiers in the Second and Third Army in the northeast and northern regions and to activate its recently expanded Internal Security Operations Command across the country to promote charter passage.

A pro-charter law, the Referendum Act, will be put in motion to discourage organised anti-charter movements. Those who oppose the charter concertedly will be liable for incarceration and fine, but the same punitive measure will not be applicable for those in favour. Opponents of the new charter will be deemed Mr Thaksin's supporters and loyalists on his payroll. The middle ground, comprising charter opponents who protested and are still against Mr Thaksin's corruption and abuses of power, is being closed off.

The new forces in power since the coup see the referendum as a new battleground on which they cannot afford to lose. A failed referendum would de-legitimatise the coup, the CNS and the Surayud government.

When the election is held either under the 2007 charter or one of its predecessors, it will have to accommodate and resolve Thailand's deeply polarised body politic.

So far, none of the major political parties has adopted the dissolved TRT party's appealing pro-poor policy platform. The danger here is that the TRT's constituents, who comprised the majority of the electorate in the last three elections going back to January 2001, will have been disenfranchised. If their needs and grievances are not reintegrated into the political system through political parties, they may well make noises that destabilise the political landscape. Leaving TRT constituents out of the electoral equation would also raise thorny questions about the legitimacy of the election.

The upcoming political realignments will likely lead to a handful of new mid-sized parties that may contest the election with an implicit or explicit bargain with the military. Gen Sonthi, who is due to retire in September, will be tempted to enter politics, perhaps as a leader or senior member of a new party. Indeed, the junta leader has been evasive about his political intentions.

Whatever happens in the electoral arena, the CNS is unlikely to return to the barracks voluntarily. The generals will want to dictate post-election outcomes as much as they can, not least because they need to protect themselves from political retribution. The generals' stay and continuation in politics will be a source of controversy and object of growing dissent. Such is another flashpoint down the road.

With the limited political clarity, Prime Minister Surayud is in a rush to usher in the election and get out. His new election date of Nov 25 may prove unrealistic as electoral laws will need time to be hammered out. The hasty return to a general election and democratic rule has emanated from a manipulated political process. It is neither organic nor natural, as was the case with the 1997 charter, which took five years to create and solidify. Such haste and manipulation are unlikely to be healthy or sustainable for Thailand's democratic rule down the road.

The Internal Security Act which the junta wants to pass is the key measure to re-establish the Army as a government within government. On first appearance, the law seems to set up a new organisation, or at least revive an old one (the Internal Security Operations Command, ISOC, which was originally formed to combat communism and had faded into the background in recent years). But this is an illusion. What the law does is give massive new powers to the Army chief. In the past, the directorship of ISOC was a stand-alone post with its own secretariat and organisation. In this law, the army chief automatically becomes head of ISOC. The chief of the Army general staff heads up the ISOC secretariat. The regional Army chiefs become the ISOC regional heads. The whole point of the bill is to give more powers to the Army and especially the chief.

And these powers are considerable. Arrest. Detention. Search. Curfew. Confinement to a house. Blocking roads. Seizing and confiscating anything. Banning meetings, gatherings, entertainment and publicity. Demanding documents and other evidence. In most cases, no warrants or authorisation are required. Even when they are, these can be dispensed with "in case of emergency". Under one extraordinary clause, an authorised official can tell anybody to do anything. This act creates a pervasive and permanent state of semi-martial law.

These powers can supposedly be invoked only to prevent or resolve threats to internal security. But the definition of internal security is very broad. It includes violent acts, but also "propaganda" or "publicity". We know from experience that those in power tend to equate any opposition to themselves as threats to national security. A year ago Thaksin was making claims of that nature. Only a few months later some soldiers growled that remarks about Sonthi's marital circumstances or Surayud's holiday accommodation were threats to national security.

In the bill draft, there is no real monitor or check on the use of this wide-ranging authority. The army head exercises these powers in his own right, not as the agent of the prime minister. The act specifies that he reports directly to the prime minister but there is no mechanism provided for the prime minister or Cabinet to exercise any oversight. The act sets up committees to oversee ISOC at the national, regional, and provincial level, but these committees are largely appointed by the Army.

In short, this act gives very considerable powers to the Army chief. It makes him in many ways more powerful than the prime minister, and not answerable to anyone. A state above the state.

To understand this legislation, it helps to know the background. The Army began campaigning for this law in February 1998 when the Chuan government announced it would repeal the tired old Anti-Communist Act of 1952 (the repeal was completed in June 2001). The Army argued that it would need a new legal basis to operate after this old act lapsed. This is very telling. For what exactly did the Army need a new legal basis to operate?

The Anti-Communist Act was passed in a context of war, the so-called Cold War which, outside the rich countries, was not "cold" at all. In that era, the Army and the rebels saw one another as enemies, and fought pitched battles. All today's top brass (Sonthi, Surayud, Vinai, Saprang, Anupong) took part in this conflict during the formative period of their lives. This new draft insecurity law is a direct descendant of the Anti-Communist Act. It is littered with some of the characteristic vocabulary of the Cold War era. It talks about unity (samakkhi), peace and order (khwam sangop riaproi), uniting the power of the masses, and protecting nation, religion, and King. The mindset is very clear.

The new Act is not needed to deal with the deep South. The State of Emergency Decree passed in 2005 was designed for that and is still being used for that purpose, That emergency decree could also be used against terrorism or drug trafficking. The whole point about this act is that it is always in force and everywhere in force, pervasive and permanent.

There is another telling sign. The draft of the bill is very sloppy. The language is inconsistent. Typos abound. Several sections are a big muddle. One amazing clause appears to require anyone thinking of starting an illegal business to keep proper personnel records. The draft has all the signs of being a hasty cut-and-paste job from old sources. Several clauses have been scissored out of the State of Emergency Decree introduced two years ago. In short, it looks like a back-of-the-envelope job by the junta's legal hitmen.

This makes one speculate why the junta recently added sixty days to its potential time in power. This extra time is not really needed to complete all the legislation for a new election. Correcting the old organic laws should consume a long afternoon at most. No, one suspects that the junta needs extra time to pass this internal security law and maybe some others.

And what does that tell us? It tells us that the junta knows it's at war; that having martyred a popular political leader and martyred a popular political party, it may now be facing a considerable enemy; that the Army cannot afford to "restore democracy" the way it wants without equipping itself with very impressive powers to use against its enemies within the society. Last September, the coup-makers talked a lot about reconciliation. Probably they got the word wrong. They must have meant capitulation, surrender.